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Rousseau (Arguments of the Philosophers series), Timothy O’Hagan. London: Routledge, 2003. xvi +
320 pages, w/ index. ISBN: 0-415-30863-1.
Written lucidly, Timothy O’Hagan’s Rousseau provides us with an attentive, rigorous study of several
themes: negative and positive religion, imagination and amour-propre, the morality of the senses, the
progress of reason, sexual difference, totalitarianism, the longing for original innocence, and the books
Discourse on the Origin of Inequality Among Men, Emile, and the Social Contract. Despite the incredible
breadth of material, O’Hagan does not sacrifice rigorous scholarship in his defense of Rousseau’s overall
coherence. The overlapping tensions considered from moral, political, religious, and secular perspectives
are not so much resolved, however, as they are explicitly and systematically connected throughout
O’Hagan’s Rousseau. Keeping this in mind, I will follow O’Hagan as he brings together seemingly
disparate lines of thought in Rousseau’s oeuvre.
Although the first movements of nature are infallible, men are currently enslaved to ignorance and
error. Rousseau provides an explanation for this development. In a primitive state the human soul is
governed by two principles: self-preservation and compassion. We are naturally inclined to protect
ourselves from danger, but we are also repulsed by the suffering of others. If we found ourselves in
the original state of nature, it is the combination of these two principles which would universally
and unerringly guide our behavior. Corruption only enters into our human constitution at the onset
of social life. In the civil state most of us live in contradiction with ourselves: reason and passion,
duty and interest, as well as autonomy and dependence are among the dualities which are
antagonistically opposed. The vast majority of us are plagued by these inner conflicts of the soul. A
veneer of happiness is precisely that: a veneer.
O’Hagan is cautious in his assessment of Rousseau’s strategy for overcoming man’s psychological
disintegration: he does not ascribe to Rousseau a one-sided alternative to social inequality (the root
of inner conflict). It is true that the imagination and amour-propre evolved in a context of
socialization which reinforced unfair legal practices and property systems (165). Society, in this
way, has been in a state of discord since the discoveries of metallurgy and arable farming (52-53).
But social inequality is not an inherent logic of civilized people. When individuals participate in
ritualistic determinations of rank and recognition, amour-propre begins to grow. It does this either
in connection with virtue or hypocrisy. Social hierarchies are nefarious only in the second
circumstance. To admire another person based upon the criterion of moral goodness is ultimately to
rejoice in a shared sense of dignity and honor. In this vein O’ Hagen writes, “To depend on opinion
in the sense of passing fashions would indeed be to surrender one’s autonomy. But to find one’s
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/igrekrev2.html[9/18/2009 5:08:16 PM]
identity in the mutual play of considered judgments would be an ideal to be striven for” (174).
Sublimated forms of self-interest and mutual recognition are not in themselves pernicious. As long
as they are generalized in such a way that everyone identifies with a common purpose, or a
sovereign will, we should consider them benign.
Questions of political and personal freedom are in this regard closely related. It is impossible to
develop a sense of morality without the proper social environment. The sentiment of conscience is
irreducible as an active faculty of freedom, for it presupposes that an autonomous individual is
capable of making decisions according to laws which apply to all members of a given society.
Rousseau argues, in his Second Discourse, that humans are distinguished from other species by the
cultivation of ideals. We strive for perfection, that is to say. But we are capable of doing this only
insofar as we are moral beings (44). In the state of nature mankind is confined to a pre-moral state
of existence for the simple reason that morality is not equivalent to an instinctual demand. Actions
based solely on physical need are passive in the sense that they are determined by a force which
exists regardless of human choice. Society introduces the likelihood of economic and political
factions, but at the same time it creates the psychological reality out of which true freedom arises.
The final realization of this process comes about through the social contract. This is not an
agreement which is forced upon the weaker members of society by those who merely wish to
solidify their advantage. Such an agreement is derived from the exercise of force as opposed to
freedom. For the agreement to have moral value, it must guarantee that the interests of each person
will be better served by promoting the common good than by remaining in a state of political
hostility. O’Hagan describes the resultant moral state of the individual quite lucidly:
Thus the passage from the natural to the social state involves a passage to a new way of
conceiving the relation of the self to others. In a legitimate society, based on the social
contract, the individual is once again dependent on society, not on another individual,
and all are equally dependent. The goal of the passage is to transform our moral
psychology, in bringing it about that we automatically consult the public interest in our
deliberations, while leaving intact the requirement that self-preservation take priority
over other demands (100).
Paradoxically, then, the process which brings us closer to freedom is the same one which requires
us to become dependent on a sovereign power.
Timothy O’Hagan concludes his book with three chapters on religion. As with earlier discussions
on morality, nature, education, and government, he elucidates the tensions in Rousseau’s work by
showing how they tend to be provocative and fruitful. Across the ideological divide, as O’Hagan
reminds us, Rousseau’s critics were united against his idiosyncratic theology. He rejected his earlier
Encyclopédiste thinking on religion and mankind when, by the Third Walk of the Reveries, he
finally came to see the dogmas of mechanistic determinism as “working in complicity with
established power to deprive the poor of their last vestige of comfort in an uncaring world” (236).
At the same time, however, he outraged Catholics and Protestants alike with his attacks on ‘original
sin’. If the doctrine were true, he claims, not only is God made responsible for a host of crimes
committed by man, and man alone, but it also follows that God becomes the source of another
injustice, namely, punishing the innocent for the sins of their father (243). Perhaps most explosive
was Rousseau’s treatment of civil religion in the Social Contract. The distinction between two basic
religions, internal and external in nature, guides him through the extreme points of tension between
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liberal, enlightened tolerance on the one hand and theocracy on the other. The religion of man is
eternal and good in that it transcends the superstitious dogmas of local custom. The religion of the
citizen, however, compensates for its externalized displays of worship by grounding itself in the
body politic. Religion is thus divided as either abstract or concrete, personal or social, veritable or
false. The compromise between the two sets of antitheses, as envisioned by Rousseau, depends upon
a civil religion stripped of its dogmas. These dogmas are few and simple in their assertions of a
beneficent, all-powerful deity, an afterlife, everlasting happiness for the just, and the sanctity of the
social contract. The one negative dogma against intolerance raises some questions for O’Hagan. It
is essential for Rousseau to separate religious dogmas which are crucial to the social contract from
others which are not, but every dividing line has its flaw: “The details of the doctrine of the Trinity
may indeed be distant from practical behavior. But Rousseau himself has argued that the doctrine of
original sin is morally dangerous, and the reader of Weber’s Protestant Ethic might be persuaded
that belief in justification through works is a spur to an industrious life” (230). Moreover, as
O’Hagan continues his line of questioning, if there are certain beliefs, especially theological ones,
which exceed our powers of voluntary assent, as Rousseau himself claims, then the problematic
nature of punishing individuals for having the wrong beliefs is all the more pronounced (231-32).
Such criticisms, laid out with deliberate and methodical attention, are all the more compelling in a
context of respect and serious engagement that can be found throughout this book.
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